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AN UNTRUSTWORTHY PRESUMPTION: 
REPLACING THE MOENCH PRESUMPTION 
WITH A SOUND STANDARD FOR STOCK-
DROP LITIGATION 
CHRISTOPHER J. BRYANT† 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly thirty million private employees participate in retirement 
plans that offer their employers’ stock (company stock) as a required 
or optional investment.1 About twenty million of those employees 
invest in company stock.2 In the aggregate, their retirement plans 
contain more than $1 trillion in company stock,3 and average about 
$50,000 individually.4 Over the past two decades, employees who have 
invested in company stock through these plans have filed numerous 
lawsuits when the prices of their companies’ stocks—and the values of 
their retirement accounts—drop.5 The employees allege that plan 
 
Copyright © 2013 Christopher J. Bryant (christopher.bryant@lawnet.duke.edu). 
 † Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2014; Duke University, A.B. in 
economics, 2008. Many thanks to Professor Deborah DeMott for advising me through the Note 
process, Jacob Charles for being a great friend and top-notch note editor, and everyone who put 
up with me talking about ERISA and the Moench presumption. 
 1.  See JACK VANDERHEI, ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFITS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, 401(K) 
PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 2011 26 (2012) 
(noting that the sample database contained 9.2 Million 401(k) plan participants, which 
represents approximately half of the universe of plan participants); Florence Olsen, ESOPs: 
Report Lists Assets of About $870 Billion Held in Employee Stock Ownership Plans, 39 PENS. & 
BENEFITS R. 345 (Feb. 2, 2012) (noting that around 10 million employees participate in ESOPs). 
 2.  See VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (noting that 4.6 million surveyed 
participants actually invest in company stock); A Statistical Profile of Employee Ownership, 
NAT’L CENTER FOR EMPL. OWNERSHIP (Feb. 2012), http://www.nceo.org/articles/statistical-
profile-employee-ownership (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (noting that about fifteen million 
individuals participate in plans that invest exclusively or primarily in company stock). 
 3.  Olsen, supra note 1. 
 4.  Some contain substantially more, others substantially less. See VanDerhi et al., supra 
note 1, at 26 (noting that the percent of money invested in company stock by each 401(k) plan 
participant varies from 0 percent to greater than 80 percent). 
 5.  See generally Michael J. Dell & Michael J. Nassau, Stock Drop Cases and the 
Presumption of Prudence: When it Applies, How it is Overcome, J. RETIRE. PLAN., Nov.–Dec. 
2009, at 13 (describing several of the more prominent cases). The defense bar refers to these 
cases with the “catchy and pejorative moniker” of “stock-drop” cases.  See Derek W. Loeser, 
Erin M. Riley, & Benjamin Gould, 2010 ERISA Employer Stock Cases: The Good, the Bad, and 
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administrators breached their fiduciary duties by continuing to invest 
in company stock or failing to warn employees of an impending drop 
in stock prices. Because the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA)6 governs the administration of these retirement 
plans,7 it serves as the source for the standards courts use to 
adjudicate these claims. 
ERISA outlines a prudent person standard of care for retirement 
plan fiduciaries, and lists duties designed to ensure that fiduciaries act 
“solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries.”8 These 
include the duties to: (1) act “for the exclusive purpose of . . . 
providing benefits to [plan] participants and their beneficiaries,” 
(2) employ the “care, skill, prudence, and diligence” that a prudential 
person acting in a similar capacity would use to conduct a similar 
plan, (3) follow plan documents to the extent that they do not conflict 
with ERISA, and (4) diversify plan investments to minimize the risk 
of large losses unless diversification would be imprudent.9 
ERISA exempts the fiduciaries of most plans that contain 
company stock from the duty to diversify.10 The Supreme Court has 
not yet offered the definitive interpretation of this provision, but 
since the Third Circuit decided Moench v. Robertson11 in 1995, circuit 
courts have consistently held that this exemption establishes a broad 
presumption of prudence for fiduciaries of plans designed to invest in 
company stock.12 This is commonly referred to as the Moench 
presumption. 
Under the Moench presumption, judicial review of fiduciaries’ 
decisions to purchase, hold, or sell company stock is subject to an 
abuse-of-discretion standard.13 To overcome the Moench 
presumption, plaintiffs must show the existence of a “dire situation” 
that threatens a company’s viability or renders the stock essentially 
 
the In Between—Plaintiffs’ Perspective, PENS. & BENEFITS DAILY, 01/28/2011, at 1, 2. Plaintiffs 
refer to these cases as employer stock cases. Id. This Note uses the term stock-drop cases for 
consistency and its visually descriptive nature, but does not align itself with either bar.   
 6.  Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).  
 7.  See Part I. 
 8.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). 
 11.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553 (1995). 
 12.  See Part II.B. 
 13.  Moench, 62 F.3d at 571. For more discussion, see Part II.  
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worthless.14 Plaintiffs in stock-drop cases have experienced great 
difficulty in meeting this standard,15 which has effectively insulated 
fiduciaries from liability in all but the most extreme circumstances.16 
Consider the following examples, which are based on actual stock-
drop cases: 
1. Plan fiduciaries have observed Big Finance, Inc. 
substantially increase its ties to the risky subprime 
securities market over the past few years, but 
continue to purchase and hold company stock. Plan 
documents require the fiduciaries to invest 20 percent 
of the plan assets in company stock. The stock price 
drops by more than 50 percent.17 
2. The plan documents for Electronic Chain Stores call 
for fiduciaries to invest up to 50 percent of plan funds 
in company stock. Despite knowing that the company 
made false statements about its earnings and 
inventory, plan fiduciaries continue to invest in 
company stock. When Electronic Chain Store takes 
actions inconsistent with its previous statements, the 
stock price drops 8 percent.18 
3. Global Eyecare Corporation’s foreign subsidiaries’ 
dishonest accounting practices have inflated its stock 
price. In addition, one of its major products is causing 
eye infections in markets around the world and will 
 
 14.  See, e.g., Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340, 348 (3d Cir. 2007) (“We cannot agree, 
however, that these developments, or the corresponding drop in stock price, created the type of 
dire situation which would require defendants to disobey the terms of the Plans . . . .”); Part II. 
 15.  See Corey Rosen, Courts Continue to Favor Defendants in Recent ‘Stock Drop' Cases, 
39 PENS. & BENEFITS R. 77 (Jan. 10, 2012) (“[S]ince July of 2010, courts have largely continued 
to favor defendants.”).  
 16.  See In re Fannie Mae 2008 ERISA Litig., 09 CIV. 1350 PAC, 2012 WL 5198463, at *4–
5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (noting that if evidence of the growing rate of foreclosures, concerns 
about the housing market, concerns about lessened underwriting standards, claims that there 
would be further deterioration of the housing market in the event of a bubble bursting, concerns 
about increased exposure to the subprime market, internal risk officers’ warning, and a decrease 
in plan assets of more than 90 percent was not sufficient to overcome the Moench presumption, 
“it is not clear what would be sufficient”). 
 17.  In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
475 (2012).  
 18.  In re RadioShack Corp. “ERISA” Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606 (N.D. Tex. 2008). 
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need to be recalled. Plan fiduciaries know this 
information, but they continue to invest 100 percent 
of plan funds in company stock. Plan participants 
allege that the fraudulent accounting practices and 
the recall have caused the stock price to drop by 25 
percent, and that plan fiduciaries breached their duty 
to deviate from the terms of the plan.19 
4. The terms of Superpower Energy’s plan require 
nearly 100 percent investment in company stock. Plan 
fiduciaries know that Superpower Energy’s stock 
trading practices over the period of two years have 
artificially inflated the price of the company stock, 
but they continue to follow the plan terms and invest 
in company stock. When the trading practices—the 
same ones used by Enron—become public 
knowledge, the stock price drops by more than 40 
percent.20 
In each of the previous scenarios, the plaintiffs failed to 
overcome the Moench presumption. Fiduciaries and other 
commentators have faulted the standard because it establishes duties 
that are contrary to ERISA’s provisions21 and provides inadequate 
guidance to the courts.22 
This Note argues that the Moench presumption—as currently 
applied by the courts—is unsound in both theory and practice 
because it is unsupported by legal doctrine and public policy. The 
Note proposes that the Moench presumption should be replaced by a 
 
 19.  In re Bausch & Lomb Inc. ERISA Litig., 06-CV-6297, 2008 WL 5234281 (W.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 12, 2008). 
 20.  Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 21.  See Petition for Writ of Certiorati, Robertson v. Moench, 1995 WL 17036143 (No. 95-
917) (“The decision below frustrates that Congressional intent by holding that ESOP fiduciaries 
may be sued under ERISA for making the very investment in employer securities that ESOPs 
are designed to make.”). 
 22.  See Dana M. Muir & Cindy A. Schipani, The Challenge Of Company Stock 
Transactions For Directors' Duties Of Loyalty, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 437, (2006) (“Beyond the 
Moench presumption of prudence, which is troubling in itself, the ERISA employer stock cases 
have not established any clear guidance as to what factual allegations present a threat of 
fiduciary breach of loyalty.”) (footnote omitted); cf. In re Fannie Mae 2008 ERISA Litig., 09 
CIV. 1350 PAC, 2012 WL 5198463, at *4–5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2012) (noting that the Second 
Circuit provided no clear guidance for determining whether a plaintiff has overcome the 
presumption of prudence). 
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narrowly defined reasonableness standard that is more in line with 
ERISA’s prudent person standard. Simply stopping the discussion 
here, however, places plan fiduciaries in an unenviable position. If 
they fail to deviate from the plan terms, they will be subject to 
liability for breach of fiduciary duty. But if fiduciaries deviate from 
the terms of the plan, they risk exposing plan participants and the 
plan itself to new and substantial tax liabilities—at least in theory—
which could constitute additional breaches of fiduciary duty. 
This Note identifies two potential solutions to the fiduciaries’ 
problem. First, Congress could amend the tax provisions governing 
the plans in question so that a fiduciary’s deviation from plan terms 
under these circumstances does not create any new tax liabilities.  
Alternatively, plan drafters could include language instructing plan 
fiduciaries to stop investing in company stock when the 
reasonableness standard renders continued investment in company 
stock imprudent. Replacing the Moench presumption and protecting 
well-intentioned fiduciaries through legislative or practical changes 
would simultaneously provide litigants—and the courts—with an 
objective framework to assess stock-drop claims, protect the 
retirement assets of private employees, and dissuade employers from 
engaging in activities that are legally, ethically, or financially 
questionable. 
The Moench presumption rests on the premise that “basic 
principles of trust law require that the interpretation of the terms of 
the trust be controlled by the settlor’s intent.”23 Although this 
statement is true,24 the court did not accurately identify or define the 
settlor’s intent in Moench.25 A settlor’s intent is often coextensive with 
a plain language interpretation of the written terms of the trust in 
traditional trust law, but this proposition does not necessarily hold 
when a statutory context requires the inclusion of certain language 
and the consideration of underlying policy concerns. Thus, the 
Moench court was imprecise in determining whether the fiduciaries’ 
actions fulfilled the settlor’s intent. Several doctrinally suspect 
decisions followed Moench because no circuit court has revisited 
Moench’s analysis of the underlying trust law. 
 
 23.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 24.  Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 4 (2003) (“The phrase “terms of the trust” means the 
manifestation of intention of the settlor with respect to the trust provisions expressed . . . .”). 
 25.  See Part II.D. 
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From a public policy perspective, the Moench presumption is 
also deficient. Because the framework lacks solid doctrinal grounding, 
courts have been forced to develop the presumption’s contours 
without true common-law or statutory guideposts.26 As a 
consequence, fiduciaries do not know the true scope of their 
responsibilities and potential litigants cannot approach a dispute 
enlightened with a clear understanding of the law and how it will be 
applied, which increases inefficiencies and costs for all interested 
parties. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Moench presumption does little to 
nothing to curb business conduct that has a direct and detrimental 
impact on stock prices and employees’ retirement accounts. 
Recognizing that making “[plan] fiduciaries virtual guarantors of . . . 
financial success” would make retirement plans that hold company 
stock unattractive options for corporate plan sponsors, the Third 
Circuit declined to impose any semblance of strict judicial second-
guessing.27 But instead of encouraging businesses to make prudent 
decision by enabling retirement plan fiduciaries to make truly 
prudent investments, the Moench presumption places the retirement 
assets of millions of private employees at risk by insulating fiduciaries 
from any meaningful judicial review. 
The literature almost uniformly acknowledges the high bar 
plaintiffs face in bringing stock-drop suits,28 but authors’ normative 
characterizations of the Moench presumption and stock-drop cases 
vary. On the heels of Moench v. Robertson, two prescient student 
notes decried the opinion for its doctrinal problems and the 
implications of the resulting relaxation of ERISA’s fiduciary 
standards.29 But an article written just over a decade after the decision 
lauded Moench for its usefulness as a standard, despite its flaws,30 
 
 26.  See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
 27.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 28.  See, e.g., Dell, supra note 3, at 16 (noting that the court has continually favored stock-
drop defendants). 
 29.  Kenneth Hayes, Note, Moench v. Robertson: When Must an Esop Fiduciary Abandon 
A Sinking Ship?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1231 (1997) (providing an early critique of the decision 
and lamenting the high burden of proof it placed on plaintiffs); John M. Wilson, Note, Are All 
ERISA Fiduciaries Created Alike? Moench v. Robertson, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 255 (1996) 
(criticizing the decision for its failure to follow precedent, disregard for other ERISA duties, 
and a failure to recognize important public policy implications). 
 30.  See Craig C. Martin, Matthew J. Renaud, and Omar R. Akbar, What's Up On Stock-
Drops? Moench Revisited, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 605, 634 (2006) (arguing that Moench 
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while another article argues that stock-drop and securities suits are 
redundant, and—because plaintiffs’ lawyers file these suits only to fee 
shop—all stock-drop litigation involving stock price 
misrepresentation should be pursued through securities laws 
litigation, not ERISA suits.31 Many commentators acknowledge the 
difficulty in creating an appropriate standard to which to subject plan 
fiduciaries,32 but none proposes a doctrinally sound alternative to the 
Moench presumption.33 
This Note is the first to articulate a doctrinally sound framework 
that protects both plan participants and plan fiduciaries and that is 
also supported by the common law of trusts, ERISA’s prudent person 
standard, and relevant policy considerations. Part I briefly introduces 
ERISA and retirement plans that contain company stock. Part II then 
traces the origins and development of the Moench presumption, 
analyzing its theoretical and practical effectiveness and limitations. 
Next, Part III proposes replacing the Moench presumption with an 
objectively defined reasonableness standard fully grounded in the law 
of trusts. Finally, Part IV puts the proposed standard through the 
paces, contrasting its effectiveness with the Moench presumption. 
  
 
provides a useful standard that should apply even though its logical extension “contradicts 
ERISA’s explicit exemption from the duty to diversify”). 
 31.  Mark Casciari & Ian Morrison, Should The Securities Exchange Act Be The Sole 
Federal Remedy For An ERISA Fiduciary Misrepresentation Of The Value Of Public Employer 
Stock?, 39 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 637 (2006). 
 32.  See, e.g., Neil A. Capobianco & Jose Martin Jara, Hot Topics in ERISA Litigation: 
From Ongoing Class Action Challenges To The Upcoming Fee Disclosure Deluge, 2011 WL 
190437, at *8 (“While the appropriate standard for stock drop litigation is still up in the air, 
there is virtually no available alternate standard except for Moench. No court has come up with 
any other viable standard.”); Ellen M. Doyle, Stephen M. Pincus, Restoring Retirement Nest 
Eggs: Managers of 401(k) Retirement Plans Owe a Fiduciary Duty of Care, Loyalty, and 
Prudence to Plan Participants. When Fiduciaries Breach These Duties, Participants Can Recover 
Their Losses through an ERISA Class Action, 45-APR Trial 46 (2009) (briefly discussing the 
difficulty in “determining the right point, or even range of right points, for an ESOP fiduciary to 
break the plan and start diversifying”). 
 33.  The only recent work to propose an alternative standard is Meredith L. Gray’s note, A 
Presumption Without Prudence: Replacing Moench v. Robertson With A Prudent “When In 
Doubt, Don't” Standard For ESOP And 401(K) Company Stock Fund Fiduciaries, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 907. Although Gray’s proposed “When in doubt, don’t” standard is appealing from a 
policy perspective, it fails to address ERISA’s exemption of EIAPs from the duty to diversify. 
The standard, which she equates to a chef “vouching for the integrity of everything on her 
menu” or fiduciaries “invest[ing] their own mother's core retirement savings in company stock 
without reasonable assurance that the investment would not be lost,” also lacks both doctrinal 
support and meaningful objective guidance for plan fiduciaries. Id. at 948.  
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I.  STATUTORY BACKGROUND:  
ERISA AND ELIGIBLE INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNT PLANS 
To understand the Moench presumption’s role and shortcomings, 
one must begin with the basics of ERISA and the eligible individual 
account plans (EIAPs) that ERISA exempts from the duty to 
diversify. This Part briefly reviews the structure of ERISA, introduces 
the most common EIAPs, and discusses the rationale behind 
investing in company stock. 
A. A Brief Overview of ERISA 
ERISA regulates the creation, administration, amendment, and 
termination of certain employer-provided employee benefit plans.34 
During the century leading up to 1974, a mix of state and federal laws 
governed these plans.35 Enacted to protect employee benefit plans 
from abuse,36 ERISA’s broad preemption clause means that federal 
law now governs when a case “relates to” a covered employee benefit 
plan.37 
ERISA borrows heavily from the language and law of trusts.38 
Covered retirement plans generally take the form of trusts, the 
fiduciaries of covered retirement plans generally function as trustees, 
and employees and retirees are beneficiaries.39 ERISA imposes 
certain duties on plan fiduciaries, including the duty of loyalty, the 
duty of prudence, the duty to diversify plan assets, and the duty to 
follow plan terms that do not violate ERISA.40 Under ERISA, the 
Secretary of Labor, other fiduciaries, plan participants, and 
beneficiaries may all sue for breach of fiduciary duty.41 Although the 
statutory framework precludes individual compensation in most 
 
 34.  ERISA covers employee welfare plans like health benefits, and employee benefit plans 
like traditional pensions, employee stock ownership plans, 401(k) plans, and some 403(b) plans. 
It does not cover government plans, church plans, or plans required to remain compliant with 
workers’ compensation laws. PAUL J. SCHNEIDER & BRIAN M. PINHEIRO, ERISA: A 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE § 2.01 n.1 (3d ed. 2008). 
 35.  Id. § 1.02. 
 36.  Id. § 1.04. 
 37.  Id. § 9.01. 
 38.  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA abounds 
with the language and terminology of trust law.”) (citing several provisions). 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 41.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). 
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scenarios,42 fiduciaries who breach their duties are personally liable to 
the plan for losses causally connected to the breach.43 
B. Eligible Individual Account Plans (EIAPs) 
Eligible Individual Account Plans (EIAPs) are a type of 
employee pension benefit covered by ERISA. Unlike the traditional 
pensions common through the middle of the twentieth century,44 these 
plans do not provide retirees with guaranteed defined benefits upon 
retirement. Instead, EIAPs are defined contribution plans that 
require employers to pay a defined amount into each eligible 
employee’s retirement account at specified intervals.45 Employees 
then invest this money in various assets through a menu of plans 
offered by their employers, which exposes their retirement accounts 
to the risks and rewards inherent in each investment.46 When 
employees retire, they have a choice between receiving a lump sum 
payment or placing the amount in their EIAPs into individual 
retirement accounts (IRAs).47 ERISA exempts EIAP trustees from 
the duty to diversify,48 and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) affords 
special tax treatment to EIAPs, their participants, and the businesses 
that contribute to them. For example, plans need not pay taxes on the 
earnings made by retirement plans until they are distributed,49 the 
IRS does not deem plan participants’ EIAP contributions to be 
taxable income until it is distributed,50 and employers may take 
deductions for contributions to EIAPs.51 The two most common 
EIAPs are Employer Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) and 401(k) 
 
 42.  29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(4); cf. In re Schering-Plough Corp. ERISA Litig., 420 F.3d 231, 232 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs may seek money damages on behalf of the fund, notwithstanding the 
fact the alleged fiduciary violations affected only a subset of the saving plan's participants.”). 
 43.  See SCHNEIDER ET. AL, supra note 34, § 8.04[B] (discussing proper defendants in 
ERISA civil enforcement actions). 
 44.  Id. § 3.03[A]. 
 45.  Id. § 3.03[B]. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. §§ 3.11–3.12. Employees may also receive distributions from their plans before they 
retire, but that is beyond the scope of this Note.  
 48.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2). 
 49.  26 U.S.C. § 402(a). 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  26 U.S.C. § 404(a). 
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plans.52 Over 50 percent of the nonfarm private workforce has access 
to an EIAP.53 
1. ESOPs. About 10 million employees participate in ESOPs.54 
To maintain their favorable tax status, ESOPs must “invest primarily 
in qualifying employer securities.”55 Accordingly, plans invest 
exclusively in company stock or in a combination of cash and 
company stock.56 ESOPs are attractive for several reasons. Some 
companies use ESOPs as a mechanism to motivate their employees.57 
Many believe an ESOP incentivizes employees to take an interest in 
the positive performance of the company’s stock by directly linking 
employees’ wealth to the price of company stock.58 In addition, 
companies also use the favorable tax treatment of ESOPs59 to finance 
strategic corporate moves. For example, ESOPs can be used as an 
anti-takeover defensive strategy or to buy shares of a departing 
owner’s stock in a closely held company.60 Finally, although it does 
not provide funding for retirement in amounts as definite as the 
income generated by a traditional pension plan, the rationale for an 
ESOP’s existence is, in no small part, to provide employees with 
retirement income. 
 
 52.  SCHNEIDER ET. AL, supra note 34, § 3.03[B]. 
 53.  See William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape of Employment-Based Retirement 
Benefits, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS (Sept. 29, 2011), 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/cm20110927ar01p1.htm. 
 54.  Olsen, supra note 1. 
 55.  26 U.S.C. § 4975(e)(7). 
 56.  Joel Hobbs, Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), Including S Corporation 
ESOPs and Anti Abuse Measures, 8-7–8-9, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/epchd804.pdf. 
 57.  Id. at 8-9. 
 58.  Although this is a commonly held view, the empirical research supporting this belief is 
mixed. Compare Douglas Kruse, Research Evidence on Prevalence and Effects of Employee 
Ownership (2002), http://www.nceo.org/articles/research-prevalence-effects-employee-
ownership (“Most studies find higher organizational commitment and identification under 
employee ownership, while studies are mixed between favorable and neutral findings on job 
satisfaction, motivation, and other behavioral measures.”) with id. (“There is clearly no 
automatic improvement of attitudes and behavior associated with being simply an employee-
owner.”).  
 59.  See notes 49–51. 
 60.  Hobbs, supra note 56, at 8-9. 
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2. 401(k) Plans. Since their inception in 1981,61 401(k) plans have 
become one of the most popular forms of retirement savings for 
private employees.62 In these plans, employees direct employers to 
place a portion of their pre-tax earnings into an individual account in 
lieu of cash compensation.63 Employers often match this amount, up 
to a statutory limit.64 The matching component of the 401(k) plans 
incentivizes employees to maximize their contributions.65 These plans 
typically offer several investment options, including stocks, bonds, 
funds, and other investment vehicles such as company stock.66 In 2010, 
approximately 20 million individuals participated in 401(k) plan that 
offered company stock as an investment option, and about half of 
these plan participants actually invested in company stock.67 
II. THE MOENCH PRESUMPTION OF PRUDENCE 
As first articulated by the Third Circuit, the Moench 
presumption states “an ESOP fiduciary who invests the assets in 
employer stock is entitled to a presumption that it acted consistently 
with ERISA by virtue of that decision.”68 Plaintiffs may rebut this 
presumption by introducing evidence of circumstances unknown to 
the settlor that would “defeat or substantially impair the purposes of 
the trust.”69 
This Part first reviews the seminal case of Moench v. Robertson 
and traces the adoption and expansion of the Moench presumption at 
the circuit court level. It then analyzes whether the presumption has 
adequately addressed the questions and concerns the Third Circuit 
 
 61.  The Revenue Act of 1978 established the structure for 401(k) plans. Pub. L. 95-600, 92 
Stat. 2763. The IRS did not issue regulations for these plans until 1981.  
 62.  401k Retirement Plans, NATIONWIDE, http://www.nationwide.com/401k-retirement-
plans.jsp (last visited Jan. 15, 2013). 
 63.  26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(2). 
 64.  See 26 U.S.C. § 401(m). 
 65.  See 26 U.S.C. § 401(k)(4)(A) (permitting employees to use matching contributions to 
incentivize employee participation in 401(k) plans). 
 66.  See Smart 401(k) Investing: Investing in Your 401(k), FINRA 
http://www.finra.org/Investors/SmartInvesting/Retirement/Smart401kInvesting/investing/ (last 
visited Jan. 15, 2013) (“The average plan offers between 8 and 12 [investment] 
alternatives . . . .”). 
 67.  VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26.  
 68.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 69.  Id. (citing Restatement (Second) § 227, cmt. g). 
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raised. Part II concludes by challenging the presumption’s doctrinal 
soundness. 
A. Moench v. Robertson 
In 1992, Charles Moench, a former employee who had 
participated in the ESOP of his employer (Statewide) during the 
preceding three years filed a class action suit on behalf of the 
Statewide ESOP.70 Between July 1989 and May 1991, the price of 
Statewide stock fell from $19.25 to less than $0.25.71 Moench’s 
amended complaint included claims against Statewide’s ESOP 
Committee—the plan fiduciaries—for breaches of fiduciary duty for 
continuing to acquire company stock during the price drop and failing 
to warn plan participants about “Statewide’s condition.”72 He also 
sought to hold the ESOP Committee liable for their co-fiduciaries’ 
alleged breaches of duty.73 
The district court held that according to plan documents, the 
ESOP Committee—which acknowledged its role as an ERISA 
fiduciary—lacked the discretion to invest ESOP funds in anything 
other than company stock.74 Because the plan was compliant with 
ERISA, the district court dismissed the breach of fiduciary claims on 
a summary judgment motion.75 On appeal, the Third Circuit vacated 
the district court’s grant of the defendant’s summary judgment 
motion.76 But this was far from a victory for Mr. Moench and the 
Statewide ESOP. 
The Third Circuit “look[ed] to the common law of trusts for 
guidance” in adjudicating the matter.77 After acknowledging the basic 
principle that a settlor’s intent controls interpretation of the terms of 
the trust, the court stated that “ignoring the general intent behind 
[ESOPs] in favor of giving beneficiaries the maximum opportunity to 
recover their losses” failed to honor the principle.78 It then addressed 
the issue of asset diversification, noting that the duty to diversify is 
 
 70.  Id. at 559. 
 71.  Id. at 556. 
 72.  Id. at 559. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. at 560. 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 556. 
 77.  Id. at 564. 
 78.  Id. at 570. 
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waivable in the common law of trusts.79 Because ERISA explicitly 
waived the duty to diversify, and, as a general rule, “ESOP fiduciaries 
should not be subject to breach-of-duty liability for investing plan 
assets in the manner and for the . . . purposes that Congress 
intended,”80 the court declined to apply a reasonableness standard of 
review to the ESOP Committee’s investment decisions.81 
Next, the court looked to the language of the ESOP’s documents, 
which directed the ESOP Committee to primarily invest in company 
stock, to determine the appropriate standard at which to hold plan 
fiduciaries liable for a breach of fiduciary duty. The court stated that 
fiduciaries had an obligation to follow a mandatory investment 
directive, unless doing so was impossible or illegal or a court 
approved a deviation.82 In contrast, fiduciaries with permissive 
investment directives needed to “exercise care, skill, and caution in 
making decisions to obtain or acquire the investment.”83 Noting that 
ESOP fiduciaries are “not absolutely required to invest in employer 
securities but [are] more than simply permitted to make such 
investments,”84 the court established a standard falling squarely in the 
middle. Instead of making ESOP fiduciaries’ continued investment in 
company stock “immune from judicial inquiry” or subjecting their 
investment decisions to “a de novo review,” the court determined 
that they should be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of prudence, 
subject only to an abuse of discretion standard.85 
B. Additional Circuit Courts Have Adopted the Moench 
Presumption 
Since 1995, the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and 
Eleventh Circuits have followed the Third Circuit’s lead and applied 
some variation of the Moench presumption of prudence in stock-drop 
suits.86 Every appellate court to consider the Moench presumption has 
 
 79.  Id. at 571 (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 227(b) [from the Prudent Investor 
Rule]).  
 80.  Id. (quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670 (8th Cir. 1992)) (quotation marks 
removed and omission in original). 
 81.  See id. at 572 (establishing the abuse of discretion standard). 
 82.  Id. at 571 (citing Restatement (Third) § 228, cmt. d [Prudent Investor Rule]). 
 83.  Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) § 228, cmt. f [Prudent Investor Rule]). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 572. 
 86.  See White v. Marshall & Ilsley Corp., 714 F.3d  980, 987–97 (7th Cir. 2013) (adopting 
the Moench presumption of prudence in stock-drop cases); Lanfear v. Home Depot, Inc., 679 
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adopted it.87 The Second Circuit, a recent adopter of the Moench 
presumption, formulated it as follows: 
[O]nly circumstances placing the employer in a dire situation that 
was objectively unforeseeable by the settlor could require 
fiduciaries to override plan terms. The presumption is to serve as 
a substantial shield that should protect fiduciaries from liability 
where there is room for reasonable fiduciaries to disagree as to 
whether they are bound to divest from company stock. The test of 
prudence is . . . one of conduct rather than results, and the abuse 
of discretion standard ensures that a fiduciary’s conduct cannot be 
second-guessed so long as it is reasonable.88 
As courts have applied the Moench presumption to new facts, 
they have elaborated on its scope and effect. Moench v. Robertson 
involved only an ESOP, but subsequent cases extended the Moench 
presumption to all EIAPs.89 Courts have struggled to outline criteria 
for facts that would be sufficient to rebut the presumption of 
prudence and overcome the abuse of discretion standard.90 To date, 
the only potentially significant circuit split is whether the Moench 
presumption is a pleading or evidentiary standard.91 The Supreme 
Court declined a petition for certiorari that addressed the issue in the 
 
F.3d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2012) (same); In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 475 (2012) (same); Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870 
(9th Cir. 2010) (same); Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008) (same); 
Kuper v. Iovenko, 66 F.3d 1447 (6th Cir. 1995) (same). 
 87.  In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d at 138 (2d Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit initially 
declined to adopt the Moench presumption, but it did not has since joined the other circuits.  
 88.  In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 140 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
475 (U.S. 2012) (quoting several cases) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 89.  See Edgar v. Avaya, Inc., 503 F.3d 340 (3d Cir. 2007) (extending the Moench 
presumption to all EIAPs based on ERISA’s exemption of all EIAPs from the duty to 
diversify). Subsequent cases have recognized this precedent. E.g., In re RadioShack  
Corp. “ERISA” Litig., 547 F. Supp. 2d 606, 613 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that it was irrelevant 
whether certain retirement plans qualified as ESOPs since the Moench presumption extended to 
all EIAPs).  
 90.  See Summers v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 453 F.3d 404, 411 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he 
plaintiffs can take some solace from the fact that determining the ‘right’ point, or even range of 
‘right’ points, for an ESOP fiduciary to break the plan and start diversifying may be beyond the 
practical capacity of the courts to determine.”). 
 91.  In Pfeil v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., the Sixth Circuit declined to follow the Second 
Circuit, which had recently adopted the Moench presumption, in applying it at the motion to 
dismiss stage. 671 F.3d 585, 592 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 12-256, 2012 WL 4009309 (Dec. 3, 
2012). 
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2012 October Term,92 but granted certiorari in a relevant case one 
year later.93 
C. Did Proposed Alternatives Pose Significant Problems? 
In Moench, the court stated that creating a rebuttable 
presumption of prudence for ESOP fiduciaries was more palatable 
than the alternatives suggested by the plan plaintiff or the 
Department of Labor.94 The court identified several problems it 
believed the Department of Loabor’s suggested standards would 
leave unsolved: 
[B]y subjecting an ERISA fiduciary’s decision to invest in 
employer stock to strict judicial scrutiny, we essentially would 
render meaningless the ERISA provision excepting ESOPs from 
the duty to diversify. Moreover, we would risk transforming 
ESOPs into ordinary pension benefit plans, which then would 
frustrate Congress’ desire to encourage employee ownership. 
After all, why would an employer establish an ESOP if its 
compliance with the purpose and terms of the plan could subject it 
to strict judicial second-guessing?95 
At a minimum, any acceptable standard would need to address 
these issues, and, according to the Third Circuit, the Moench 
presumption fit the bill. But was it ever a real possibility that the duty 
to diversify would be obviated or that ESOPs would be transformed 
into “ordinary pension benefit plans?” The answers, respectively, are 
no and maybe. 
The court overemphasized the significance of ERISA’s 
exemption of trustees from the duty to diversify. In the common law 
of trusts, the duty to diversify encapsulates modern portfolio theory.96 
Because of market, industry, and firm risk, a failure to adequately 
diversify trust assets is imprudent unless some special circumstance 
 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Dudenhoefer v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. granted in part, 
No. 12-751, 2013 WL 6510745 (U.S. Dec. 13, 2013). 
 94.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 95.  Id. 
 96. See John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Future of Trust 
Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 646–47 (1996) (noting that the Uniform Prudent Investors 
Act—which lays out many conceps involved in the common law of trusts—emphasizes 
diversification of assets because of modern portfolio theory). 
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warrants a highly concentrated investment.97 The duty to diversify is a 
default rule, meaning that settlors may direct trustees to make 
noncapricious, undiversified investments.98 When plaintiffs bring a 
claim for breach of fiduciary duty for the imprudent continued 
investment in company stock, it is distinct from a claim for failure to 
diversify under the default rule.99 When plaintiffs sue fiduciaries for 
continued investment in company stocks, they are suing because they 
believe the investment was imprudent in light of the circumstances, 
not because failure to diversify is per se imprudent. The fact that 
other courts have not followed Moench’s formalistic interpretation100 
demonstrates that the risk of obviating the exemption from the duty 
to diversify was minimal at best. But courts have continued to 
highlight the risk of turning ESOPs into “ordinary pension benefit 
plans” through increased judicial scrutiny of fiduciaries’ decisions to 
continue to invest in company stock.101 
D. Settlor’s Intent or Congressional Intent? 
In Moench, the Third Circuit superimposed the common law of 
trusts over ERISA’s statutory provisions to determine the scope of 
ESOP fiduciaries’ duties.102 Following the Supreme Court’s lead, it 
noted that “ERISA abounds with the language and terminology of 
trust law,”103 and ERISA’s legislative history made it clear that 
Congress intended to task ERISA fiduciaries with the duties that 
 
 97.  Id. at 647. 
 98.  John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 
1112 (2004). 
 99.  See Quan v. Computer Sciences Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 881 (9th Cir. 2010) (“We do not 
read the Moench presumption to apply to a ‘diversification’ claim, because a presumption of 
prudence is unnecessary where fiduciaries are not subject to a prudence requirement to begin 
with. On the other hand, where employer stock is only one of the possible plan investments, and 
plaintiffs assert a claim that the fiduciary should have divested the plan of employer stock, the 
fiduciaries would be entitled to the presumption that investment in employer stock was 
prudent.”). 
 100.  See, e.g., id. (declining to equate a claim for a breach of fiduciary duty stemming from 
continued investment in company stock with a simple claim for failure to diversify investments). 
 101.  See, e.g., In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., 662 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 475 (U.S. 2012) (adopting the Moench presumption, in part, because “it provides the 
best accommodation between the competing ERISA values of protecting retirement assets and 
encouraging investment in employer stock”). 
 102.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 564 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 103.  Id. (quoting Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660, 670 (8th Cir. 1992)). 
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originated in trust law.104 It also noted that trust law principles require 
that the settlor’s intent control its interpretation of the terms of the 
trust. To provide support for the Moench presumption, the Third 
Circuit made one major doctrinal move: defining the settlor’s intent 
as increasing employee ownership through investing in company 
stock.105 Upon close inspection, this definition appears to be too 
narrow. 
The Restatement (Second) of Trusts106 defines the phrase “terms 
of the trust” as any words or actions that manifest the settlor’s 
externally expressed intent at the time the trust was created.107 The 
comments provide that the terms of the trust “may be determined by 
interpretation of the words or conduct of the settlor in the light of all 
the circumstances.”108 Potentially relevant circumstances include the 
relationship between the settlor and beneficiaries, their financial 
circumstances, the type of property included in the trust, business 
custom, and the “circumstances under which the trust is to be 
administered.”109 
But the Moench court conducted limited inquiries into the words 
or actions of Statewide or its agents at the time of the ESOP’s 
creation. In fact, the only reference to Statewide’s words or actions at 
the time of the ESOP’s creation is the fact that plan documents 
included the directive to invest “primarily” in company stock.110 But 
when it interpreted the terms of the plan, the court appeared to 
conflate the trust law concept of settlor’s intent—the words, actions, 
and circumstances that manifest the settlor’s intent—with boilerplate 
plan language. This language signifies no more than the fact that 
Statewide intended the trust to take the form of an ESOP. Federal 
regulations require all ESOP documents to include such 
 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  See id. at 568. 
 106.  This Note uses the Restatement (Second) of Trusts to analyze the court’s decision and 
to create a new standard for EIAP fiduciaries because the Restatement (Third) was incomplete 
when Moench was decided. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the emerging benefit-the-
beneficiaries rule provide additional support for the proposed standard, but that is beyond the 
scope of this Note.  
 107.  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 (1959). 
 108.  Id. § 4, cmt. a. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See Moench, 62 F.3d at 567 (“For instance, the plan documents state that assets are to 
be invested primarily in Statewide stock. Therefore, it seems counterintuitive for the Committee 
to interpret the plan as requiring it to invest exclusively in Statewide stock.”). 
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terminology.111 Instead of providing some insight into the underlying 
purpose of the Statewide ESOP, the “primarily” language shows only 
that Statewide intended to set up a plan that complied with federal 
regulations. 
In defining the settlor’s intent, the court also singled out one of 
the circumstances under which the Statewide ESOP was to be 
administered. The court focused, albeit quite narrowly, on the ESOPs 
role within ERISA’s statutory framework. After distinguishing 
ESOPs from traditional pension plans and noting that ESOPs’ lack of 
diversification placed employees’ retirement assets at a greater risk 
than plans subject to ERISA’s diversification requirements,112 the 
court briefly discussed the “original rationale” behind the ESOP—
”expanding the national capital base among employees.”113 Stopping 
just short of explicitly stating that increased employee ownership of 
companies was the settlor’s intent, the court stated that the extent of 
ESOP fiduciaries’ duties should conform to the “general intent 
behind such plans.”114 
The court failed adequately to assess the words, actions, and 
circumstances surrounding the creation of the Statewide ESOP. In 
the court’s eyes, the prescribed means of investment—primarily 
purchasing company stock—was the ESOP’s purpose. But it 
improperly imputed special meaning to a boilerplate phrase and 
substituted congressional intent for settlor’s intent. 
III.  DEVELOPING A NEW STANDARD 
Because ERISA is replete with the language of trusts, trust law 
should serve as the foundation for any new standard of fiduciary 
obligation.115 Determining the full extent of a trustee’s fiduciary duty 
requires first identifying the settlor’s intent, or purpose, for creating 
the trust.116 When the express terms of the trust no longer reflect the 
 
 111.  See 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11(b) (“A plan constitutes an ESOP only if the plan 
specifically states that it is designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.”). 
 112.  Moench, 62 F.3d at 568. 
 113.  Id. 
 114.  Id. at 570. 
 115.  Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110 (1989) (“ERISA's legislative 
history confirms that the Act's fiduciary responsibility provisions, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114, 
‘codif[y] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles developed in the 
evolution of the law of trusts.’” (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 533, 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4649)). 
 116.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4 (1959) (noting that the terms of the trust are a 
manifestation of the settlor’s external intent). 
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settlor’s intent, fiduciaries may be liable for continuing to adhere to 
the offending terms.117 These basic principles undergird the proposed 
standard. 
This Part first identifies the default settlor’s intent for ESOPs 
and 401(k) plans, distinguishing the static terms of the plan from the 
“terms of the trust” that are coextensive with the settlor’s intent. It 
then delineates a framework to determine when plan fiduciaries have 
an obligation to deviate from the static terms of the plan. Finally, 
Section C addresses some practical considerations that adopting the 
new standard would present. 
A. Identifying the Default Settlor’s Intent for ESOPs and 401(k) 
Plans 
Case law and scholarship define the settlor’s intent as the 
settlor’s purpose for creating the trust at the time of the trust’s 
creation.118 The trust’s written terms may evince the settlor’s intent 
but are not conclusive.119 Trust law instructs the court to look beyond 
the written terms of the trust to the actions of the settlor and the 
circumstances surrounding the trust’s creation to determine the 
settlor’s intent in unclear situations.120 Because federal regulations 
dictate some of the trust’s language,121 the circumstances surrounding 
the creation of the trust—particularly the relationship between the 
settlor and the beneficiaries, their financial situations, and the 
statutory overlay—take on an increased importance. 
Settlors of ESOPs and 401(k) plans do not enter into a 
contractual agreement with future plan participants at the time the 
plans are created. Nonetheless, contract principles are helpful in 
understanding the relationship between initial plan settlors and future 
 
 117.  See id. § 167(3) (“[T]he trustee is subject to liability for failure . . . to deviate from the 
terms of the trust[] if he knew or should have known of the existence of [unanticipated] 
circumstances [that would defeat or substantially impair the purpose of the trust.]”) 
 118.  See generally John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law's Limits on the 
Settlor's Power to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2010) (discussing the origins and 
limitations of the settlor’s intent). 
 119. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 4, cmt. a. (noting that the surrounding circumstances 
inform the interpretation of the settlor’s intent where the written and oral words are 
insufficient). 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See note 111 and accompanying text.  
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plan participants vis–à–vis the settlor’s intent.122 The initial settlor and 
plan participants bargain for their mutual benefit, and ERISA’s 
statutory overlay shapes both the contract’s language and its 
underlying public policy considerations. Initial plan participants defer 
present cash compensation for increased capital ownership and future 
financial security.123 This increased future financial security includes 
consideration for the interests of plan participants’ beneficiaries, 
whose interests are substantially similar to those of future plan 
participants. Therefore, the interests of present and future plan 
participants are effectively identical. 
The settlor exchanges ownership of company stock and matching 
cash contributions for an incentivized workforce and favorable tax 
treatment.124 In theory ESOPs, which invest primarily in company 
stock, incentivize beneficiaries by aligning their interests with those 
that will increase the company’s stock price and the value of their 
retirement accounts.125 It logically follows that company stock 
ownership through 401(k) plans would create similar incentives, with 
a slight variation. Increased diversification in plan assets may shift 
beneficiaries’ incentives from a simple alignment with the price of 
company stock to a more complex sense of loyalty tied to an 
increased likelihood of future financial security. In each case, the 
default settlor’s intent, or purpose for creating the plan, is 
incentivizing beneficiaries through some combination of capital and 
cash contributions that provide future financial security and engender 
goodwill. 
 
 122.  Discussing a different issue involving fiduciary duties under ERISA, Professor 
Langbein suggested that the contract framework may be helpful in interpreting plan terms 
because, unlike donative transfers, EIAPs “arise from contract rather than gratuity.” John H. 
Langbein, The Supreme Court Flunks Trusts, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 207, 211 (1990). The piece 
discusses the Court’s decision not to use contract law to determine the terms of a benefits plan 
at some length, and suggests that it would have provided more “candor” than attempting to 
operate exclusively in trust law. Id. at 223–29. 
 123.  See generally DOUGLAS KRUSE ET AL., MOTIVATING EMPLOYEE-OWNERS IN ESOP 
FIRMS: HUMAN RESOURCE POLICIES AND COMPANY PERFORMANCE (2004), available at 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/19930/1/Motivating_Employee_Owners_in_ESOP_Firms_Human_Resou
rce_Policies_and_Company_Performance.pdf (discussing the incentive structure and 
effectiveness of ESOPs). 
 124.  See Douglas L. Kruse, Why Do Firms Adopt Profit-Sharing and Employee Ownership 
Plans?, 34 BRIT. J.I.R. 515 (1996). 
 125.  See Kruse, supra note 58 (discussing the empirical research on the motivational effect 
of ESOPs). 
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B. A Framework to Determine When the Settlor’s Intent Requires 
Plan Fiduciaries to Deviate from Fixed Plan Terms 
As long as the settlor’s intent is not illegal, impossible, or against 
public policy, the trustee generally has an obligation to adhere to the 
terms of the trust.126 But the doctrine of deviation, which is notably 
absent from the Moench opinion, requires fiduciaries to depart from 
the static terms of the trust when they know or should know that, due 
to unanticipated circumstances, the terms no longer effectuate the 
settlor’s intent.127 The following framework proposes a process for 
identifying when unanticipated circumstances require EIAP 
fiduciaries to deviate from the terms of the plan. 
1. What Percentage of the EIAP’s Assets are Invested in Company 
Stock? ERISA requires non-EIAP retirement plans to diversify their 
investments128 and forbids them from holding more than 10 percent of 
their assets in company stock.129 All EIAPs are exempt from these 
requirements, and different plans use this exemption to create a wide 
range of investment portfolios. ESOPs, by definition, invest primarily 
in company stock.130 In comparison, some 401(k) plans offer no 
company stock, while others permit plan participants to hold more 
than 80 percent of their assets in company stock.131 Accordingly, one 
must first identify the type of plan to determine whether a fiduciary’s 
decision to continue to invest in company stock—either through new 
acquisitions or continued holdings—was contrary to the settlor’s 
intent. 
The proposed standard would apply only to EIAPs that 
authorize or require fiduciaries to invest more than 20 percent of the 
plan’s assets in company stock. This threshold intentionally shields 
the decisions of many EIAP fiduciaries to continue to invest in 
company stock from strict scrutiny.132 The trust law duty to diversify 
 
 126.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Restatement (Third) § 
228, cmt. d [Prudent Investor Rule]). 
 127.  See Langbein, supra note 118, at 394 n.141 (discussing the doctrine of deviation). 
 128.  29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). 
 129.  29 U.S.C. § 1107. 
 130.  See Part I.B.1. 
 131.  See VANDERHEI ET AL., supra note 1, at 26 (noting that 6 percent of the survey 
respondents participated in 401(k) plans that invested more than 80 percent of their assets in 
company stock). 
 132.  Many 401(k) plans do not offer an investment option that includes company stock. Id. 
at 24, 26.  
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essentially tracks onto modern portfolio theory.133  And modern-
portfolio-theory-based investment advice counsels against holding 
more than 20 percent of available funds in a single asset.134 Holding an 
EIAP fiduciary who invests no more than 20 percent of the plan 
assets in company stock to a reasonableness standard would render 
meaningless ERISA’s exemption from the duty to diversify.135 For 
EIAPs investing minimally in company stock, the current Moench 
presumption should remain the standard for assessing fiduciary 
liability. 
2. What Qualifies as an Unanticipated Circumstance? When trust 
fiduciaries know or should know of some circumstance unknown to 
and unanticipated by the settlor that would “defeat or substantially 
impair the purposes of the trust,” they may be held liable for failing to 
deviate from the terms of the trust.136 In the contract law framework 
discussed in Part III.A, the circumstances known or anticipated to the 
settlor become those known, anticipated, and bargained for by the 
initial EIAP settlor and plan participants. 
Assuming that EIAP settlors and beneficiaries are rational and 
savvy businesspeople,137 they would anticipate changes in the price of 
 
 133.  See note 96. 
 134.  Retirement planners, taking modern portfolio theory’s principle of diversification into 
account, counsel employees against investing more than 20 percent of their assets in company 
stock. See e.g., VANGUARD, Avoid These Common Pitfalls, 
https://retirementplans.vanguard.com/VGApp/pe/pubeducation/retirement/Startingtosave/pitfal
ls/Pitfalls.jsf?SelectedSegment=StartingtoSave&Article=Avoid+these+common+pitfalls (last 
visited Dec. 13, 2012). Under modern portfolio theory, firm risk accounts for 20 percent of the 
risk in a stock’s price. Langbein, supra note 96, at 647 (citing R.A. BREALEY, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO RISK AND RETURN FROM COMMON STOCKS 117 (2d ed. 1983)). 
 135.  Taking action for variations less than 20 percent due to unanticipated circumstances 
would technically not be the same thing as holding fiduciaries accountable for the duty to 
diversify from which they are exempted. But it functionally has the effect of requiring them to 
manage more risk than is generally acceptable as regular firm risk under modern portfolio 
theory. See note 134. 
 136.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167. 
 137.  This is a generous assumption that favors the settlors, but is important to permit 
companies to continue to operate with the level of risk permitted by the business judgment rule. 
Most beneficiaries make irrational investment decisions, especially where company stock is 
concerned. See Marvin H. Stroud, “Don't Put Your Eggs In One Basket”: Reforming 401(K) 
Pensions To Address The Educational And Psychological Issues That Drive Good Employees To 
Make Bad Investment Decisions, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 437 (2010) (discussing the fact that 
employees typically aren’t savvy investors and make poor investing decisions, especially when 
presented with an investment option that includes company stock). 
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company stock due to market fluctuations.138 They also anticipate 
price changes resulting from industry-related hiccups,139 and recognize 
that decisions made by the business firm and its agents would affect 
the stock price. But does the resulting EIAP represent beneficiaries’ 
acquiescence in all forces that may affect stock price, whether 
stemming from financial markets, the company’s industry, the firm 
itself, or natural forces? Rational settlors and beneficiaries realize 
that they are incapable of controlling the market, specific industries, 
natural disasters, and potentially costly fluke litigation. But all should 
be understood to bargain with the understanding that they are 
rational individuals and that the company will be managed rationally. 
When viewed as a contract between two rational parties, EIAP 
documents should be understood to implicitly exclude irrational 
business decisions from the list of acceptable reasons for changes in 
the price of the company’s stock. Therefore, unanticipated 
circumstances that may warrant deviation from the terms of an EIAP 
include situations in which companies and their agents conduct 
themselves irrationally. 
The business judgment rule provides ample guidance for 
determining when business decisions are irrational. The business 
judgment rule affords corporate directors or officers a presumption 
that they fulfilled their duties of care in partaking in a business 
judgment, provided, in part, that they: 
(2) [are] informed with respect to the subject of the business 
judgment . . . reasonably believe[d] to be appropriate under the 
circumstances; and  
(3) rationally believe[] the business judgment is in the best 
interests of the corporation.140 
This has been a high standard for most plaintiffs to meet,141 but 
EIAP fiduciaries need not litigate the business-judgment rule to the 
 
 138.  See Langbein, supra note 96, at 647, n.47 (noting that individuals familiar with modern 
portfolio theory ascribed very specific risk profiles firm risk, market risk, industry risk, etc.). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(c) (2012); see also Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984) (articulating the business judgment rule to require that directors and officers act “on an 
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the company”). 
 141.  Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn't a Rule: The Business Judgment Rule, 36 VAL. 
U. L. REV. 631, 631 (2002) (“[T]he business judgment rule] could be called a standard of non-
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fullest extent. Instead, if a reasonable plan fiduciary would conclude 
that company directors’ actions were irrational because they were 
made in bad faith or on improper information,142 EIAP fiduciaries 
should recognize that an unanticipated circumstance has occurred. 
3. Is Continued Investment in Company Stock Still Consistent 
with the Settlor’s Intent? Under trust law, trustees may be subject to 
liability for failing to deviate from the terms of the trust if complying 
with the terms no longer effectuates the settlor’s intent.143 The manner 
in which the court determines whether a fiduciaries’ deviation was 
justified depends on the circumstances when the deviation took place, 
and, in some instances, the circumstances when the deviation is 
before the court. If the deviation occurred during an “emergency,” 
the court will approve the deviation if the court would have approved 
the deviation based on the information available at the time of the 
deviation.144 If the court would not have approved the decision based 
on information available at the time of the deviation, it will not 
approve the deviation.145 In nonemergency situations, the court will 
approve the deviation if it would have approved the deviation based 
on the information available at the time of the deviation, and the 
court would still approve the deviation based on information 
available “at the time the deviation is before the court.”146 It may 
approve the deviation if the court would not have approved the 
deviation at the time it occurred, but would have at the time it is 
before the court.147 But, in nonemergency situations, the court will not 
approve a deviation from the terms of the trust “if the deviation is 
such that the court would not have authorized it at the time when the 
propriety of the deviation is before the court.”148 
For practical purposes discussed in Part III.C, it makes sense to 
use the emergency standard to assess an EIAP fiduciary’s decision to 
 
review, entailing no review of the merits of a business decision corporate officials have made.” 
(citing DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE §§ 7.01-720 (1993))). 
 142.  See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006). 
 143.  Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167. The Restatement permits trustees to petition 
the court for the ability to deviate for plan documents, but for reasons discussed in Part III.C, 
this discussion only discusses instances where the trustee deviates from the express terms of the 
trust without first seeking the court’s permission.  
 144.  Id. § 167, cmt. f.  
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
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continue with or deviate from plan terms. If company stock makes up 
more than 20 percent of an EIAP’s assets, and an unanticipated 
circumstance occurs, EIAP fiduciaries must determine whether 
continued investment in company stock is consistent with the settlor’s 
intent of incentivizing beneficiaries through providing retirement 
income and engendering goodwill. At what specific point must 
reasonable EIAP fiduciaries deviate from the express terms of the 
plan? The answer to this question will vary case-by-case, depending 
on the probable effect of the unanticipated circumstance on the price 
of the stock and the total percentage of company stock in the EIAP. 
In ESOPs and other EIAPs with high concentrations of company 
stock, the potential of relatively small decreases in stock price—15 to 
25 percent—that result from unanticipated circumstances that a 
reasonable fiduciary would attribute to violations of the business 
judgment rule would trigger a duty to deviate from the terms of the 
plan.149 But as an EIAP’s concentration of company stock approaches 
20 percent, the potential decrease in stock price necessary to trigger a 
duty to deviate from the terms of the plan would also increase. And, 
as discussed in Part III.B.1, the Moench presumption would continue 
to apply to EIAPs that invest no more than 20 percent of their assets 
in company stock.150 
At first glance, this sliding-scale inverse standard seems to evade 
ERISA’s exemption of EIAPs from the duty to diversify. However, 
the relationship only empowers fiduciaries to carry out the settlor’s 
intent of incentivizing employees’ performance. Following the same 
logic used to support ESOPs, employees become demoralized, not 
incentivized, when they lose large amounts of their retirement savings 
due their employer’s irrational business activities. This standard 
simply accounts for the unarticulated agreement between an EIAP 
settlor and initial—and future—plan participants. 
 
 149.  Reasonable minds will differ on the low-end percentage of the stock price decrease 
range. On one hand, it is conceivable to want to compensate EIAPs for any losses due to 
irrational business decisions, regardless of how small. And these suits could serve as an 
encouragement for companies to refrain from making decisions that violate the business-
judgment rule. On the other hand, there is a point where the cost of defending and settling these 
cases outweighs the benefit they bring to the plans. Because modern portfolio theory attributes 
20 percent of a stock’s performance to the company’s business decisions, I set the range around 
this mark. 
 150.  I am grateful for Professor Deborah DeMott’s analogy between this approach and the 
Second Circuit’s definition of reasonable care in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 
169 (2d Cir. 1947). 
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C. Practical Considerations 
This proposed standard presents several practical challenges. 
First and foremost, EIAPs, employers, and employees risk losing 
their favorable tax treatment when plan fiduciaries deviate from the 
expressly written terms of the plan.151 Employees, employers, and plan 
participants would all face immediate tax liabilities.152 Congress could 
fix this problem by changing the Internal Revenue Code to exempt 
necessary deviations from new tax liability. But encouraging plan 
drafters to include a clause that permits deviation from the plans’ 
initial terms in the case of unanticipated circumstances may offer a 
more simple solution.153 The Department of Labor could force the 
point by issuing new regulations mandating terms to be included in all 
EIAPs—akin to the Internal Revenue Service’s regulation of terms 
that must appear in ESOPs.154 
After addressing the tax issue, the question of how plan 
fiduciaries on the ground will deviate from the initial plan terms 
remains. As noted in Part III.B.3, the Restatement permits trustees to 
petition the court for permission to deviate from the terms of the trust 
and establishes liability for breach of fiduciary duty when they fail to 
petition the court under certain circumstances. But EIAP fiduciaries 
instructed by plan documents to invest in company stocks face a 
problem when they petition the court. As this Note articulates the 
proposed rule, EIAP fiduciaries would petition the court only when 
they reasonably believed continuing to invest in company stock was 
imprudent, in light of what they reasonably understood to be conduct 
inconsistent with the business judgment rule. But if fiduciaries 
actually petitioned the court in such a manner, they would risk 
 
 151.  Failure to follow term plans results in plan disqualification. Revenue Procedure 94-62, 
1994-2 C.B. 778. See also Tax Consequences of Plan Disqualification, 
http://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/Tax-Consequences-of-Plan-Disqualification (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2013) (citing Rev. Rul. 2007-48, 2007-30 I.R.B. 129 and Rev. Rul. 74-299, 1974-1 C.B. 
154). 
 152.  Tax Consequences of Plan Disqualification, supra note 151. 
 153.  See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 167, cmt. d (“Where terms of the trust provide 
for change of circumstances. The settlor may manifest an intention to authorize the trustee, in 
the event of a change of circumstances, to do acts not otherwise authorized, if such acts are 
necessary to prevent a defeat or substantial impairment of the purposes of the trust. In such case 
it is not necessary for the trustee to apply to the court for permission to do the act, since it is not 
a deviation from the terms of the trust to do the act.”).  
 154.  See 26 C.F.R. § 54.4975-11(b) (“A plan constitutes an ESOP only if the plan 
specifically states that it is designed to invest primarily in qualifying employer securities.”). 
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exacerbating the feared decrease in stock price. Accordingly, an 
extrajudicial deviation—as the Restatement provides for155—would 
likely be necessary to minimize any additional negative impact on the 
stock’s price. In a similar vein, deviating EIAP fiduciaries would face 
the difficult task of determining the proper method of deviation. 
Because an EIAP often holds substantial amounts of company stock, 
a sell-off risks decreasing the price of the company’s stock, which is 
precisely what the fiduciary seeks to avoid.156 These concerns may 
have the long-term effect of limiting EIAP options that invest more 
than 20 percent of their assets in company stock.157 
IV.  APPLYING THE PROPOSED STANDARD TO EIAP FIDUCIARIES 
As a threshold matter, the proposed standard successfully 
addresses several concerns raised by Moench and its progeny. It 
provides clear, objective standards for when an EIAP fiduciary has an 
obligation to deviate from the terms of a plan. It does not subject 
EIAP fiduciaries to the duty to diversify or threaten to turn ESOPs 
into ordinary pension benefit plans. In the absence of congressional 
action on the tax issue, plan drafters can simply add a clause that 
allows temporary deviation. And, depending on the reason why and 
manner in which an EIAP fiduciary deviates from the terms of the 
plan, it may not raise any insider-trading concerns.158 
 
 155.  Restatement (Second) Trusts § 167, cmt. f , illus. 23. 
 156.  See Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243, 256 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[F]rom a 
practical standpoint, compelling fiduciaries to sell off a plan's holdings of company stock may 
bring about precisely the result plaintiffs seek to avoid: a drop in the stock price.”).  
 157.  Creating a playbook for the deviating EIAP fiduciary is beyond the scope of this Note, 
but here are a few brief suggestions for how a fiduciary might handle this issue. Because the 
entire purpose of the EIAP is to align the interests of the settlor and beneficiaries, fiduciaries 
may look to the company for help in stabilizing the stock price during and after a deviation. 
Perhaps, provided securities regulations allow, the company could buy back some of the EIAPs 
outstanding stocks. As an additional option, EIAP fiduciaries could attempt to decrease its 
holdings and maintain the stock price by selling off the stock in large blocks and repurchasing 
small percentages. Alternatively, the EIAP could maintain its holding of company stock at 
current levels, but decrease the volume of stock it purchases, offsetting its exposure with OTC 
equity swaps. Again, resolving this issue is beyond the scope of this note, but adoption of the 
proposed standard will require fiduciaries to develop a system of best practices for deviating 
from express plan terms. 
 158.  Courts have yet to tackle the question of insider trading relating to stock-drop suits 
because the case has yet to present itself. It is plausible, in light of the countervailing policy 
concerns of maintaining the retirement account, that the S.E.C. would refrain from prosecuting 
for insider trades related to fulfilling EIAP fiduciary duties. It is also not clear that deviating 
EIAP fiduciaries would meet the scienter requirement. See S.E.C. v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 286 (2d 
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To compare and contrast the proposed standard and the Moench 
presumption, consider the examples from the Introduction.159  In each 
of these scenarios, the plaintiffs failed to overcome the Moench 
presumption because the company’s viability was not threatened. The 
standard proposed in this Note would likely reach the same 
conclusion in all but one of these scenarios, albeit for different 
reasons.160 
In the first example, the EIAP does not meet the new standard’s 
threshold requirement of mandating more than a 20 percent 
investment in company stock. Thus, the Moench presumption applies. 
Because a “dire situation” did not threaten the company’s viability or 
future existence—but more importantly, because 20 percent is within 
the diversification range for single assets posited by modern portfolio 
theory—continued investment in the company stock was not 
imprudent. 
In contrast, the EIAP from the second example would meet the 
20 percent investment requirement. And because a reasonable 
fiduciary could consider the company’s false statements to violate the 
business judgment rule, an unanticipated circumstance has occurred. 
But the decrease in stock price is too small to “defeat or substantially 
impair” the plan’s purpose—here, incentivizing employees by 
increasing their capital ownership, providing them with a retirement 
account, and aligning their goals with those of the company.161 
The third example is less straightforward than the first two sets 
of facts, thereby highlighting the emphasis the proposed standard 
would place on pleading adequate facts to state a claim. The plan 
meets the threshold company stock requirement, but the fact pattern 
does not provide enough information to determine whether plan 
fiduciaries have an obligation to deviate from the terms of the plan 
document. The major deficiency is that the fact pattern does not 
specify whether anticipated circumstances—recalls are routine 
business practice—or unanticipated circumstances—the fraudulent 
accounting practices—caused the decrease in price. To plead 
 
Cir. 2012) (“Liability for securities fraud requires proof of scienter, defined as ‘a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’” (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 U.S. 185, 193 & n.12 (1976))). 
 159.  Supra notes 17–22 and accompanying text.   
 160.  These cases do not contain information about what fiduciaries would have estimated 
the decreased stock price to be, based on the available information. I assume that a reasonable 
fiduciary would estimate somewhere within 5 percent of the actual figures.  
 161.  See generally Krouse, supra note 123. 
AN UNTRUSTWORTHY PRESUMPTION (MACROED) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/31/2014  10:49 PM 
2013] AN UNTRUSTWORTHY PRESUMPTION 29 
sufficient facts to state a claim, the plan plaintiffs would need to 
disaggregate the causes of the stock drop and plausibly allege that the 
fraudulent accounting practices accounted for an adequate portion of 
the decrease in the price drop. Using the new standard, a court would 
likely dismiss the complaint without prejudice and grant the plaintiffs 
leave to amend the complaint instead of outright dismissing it, as 
would happen under Moench. 
The proposed standard’s divergence from the Moench 
presumption is most evident in the fourth and final example. In 
Kirshbaum v. Reliant Energy,162 the case underlying case this scenario, 
corporate officers with knowledge of the stock trading practices that 
artificially inflated the stock’s price served as EIAP fiduciaries.163 The 
SEC mounted an investigation into Reliant Energy’s practices,164 the 
company was forced to restate its earning,165 and it settled a sizeable 
lawsuit stemming from claims associated with its trading practices.166 
Despite the overwhelming evidence of deceptive practices and the 
large losses to the company’s EIAP, the court found no breach of 
fiduciary duty. Instead, the case ensconced the Moench presumption 
in the Fifth Circuit.167 
Applying the proposed standard, a court should reach a different 
conclusion. The plan greatly exceeded the 20 percent company stock 
requirement. And in light of the fact that plan fiduciaries knew of the 
trading activities and those activities prompted an SEC investigation, 
a reasonable plan fiduciary should easily conclude that the conduct in 
question fell outside the business judgment rule. Finally, the 
magnitude of the plan’s concentration of company stock and the 
potential decrease in stock price increased the statistical likelihood of 
large losses in employees’ retirement accounts, which implies that the 
plan’s fiduciaries would have an obligation to deviate from the terms 
of the plan to continue to fulfill the settlor’s intent of incentivizing 
employees. 
These illustrations demonstrate that, like the Moench 
presumption, the proposed standard focuses neither on maximizing 
 
 162.  Kirschbaum v. Reliant Energy, Inc., 526 F.3d 243 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 163.  Id. at 247. 
 164.  Stephen Taub, Reliant, Deloitte Settle with Investors, CFO.COM, 
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/4243831, Aug. 1, 2005.  
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. 
 167.  See Kirschbaum, 536 F.3d at 254 (“The Moench presumption logically applies to any 
allegations of fiduciary duty breach for failure to divest an EIAP or ESOP of company stock.”). 
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plans’ profits nor minimizing plan losses. Unlike the Moench 
presumption, however, the proposed standard seeks to honor the 
settlor’s intent in an objective, logical, and doctrinally supported 
manner. 
CONCLUSION 
When it decided Moench v. Robertson, The Third Circuit left 
several questions unanswered: 
How is an ESOP fiduciary to determine when diversification is in 
the best interest of the beneficiaries? Is the fiduciary always to seek 
the return-maximizing investment, or is there some nontangible 
loyalty interest served by retaining ESOP investments in employer 
stock? Additionally, to what extent should ESOPs be considered 
retirement plans, notwithstanding the qualification contained in 
most of them, including Statewide’s, that they are not designed to 
guarantee retirement income?168 
By providing an objective framework within which plan 
participants and trustees may set their expectations and evaluate the 
merits of claims and defenses, the proposed standard answers the first 
two questions posed in Moench. The emergence of ESOPs and 401(k) 
plans as the most popular retirement accounts for private employees 
answers the last question. 
From a public policy perspective, the United States should not 
adhere to a standard that does not recognize and protect the social 
policy that undergirds ERISA retirement plans—even those plans 
that it exempts from the duty to diversify. EIAP fiduciaries will need 
to develop methods for deviating from the plans of the term without 
exacerbating price drops resulting from companies’ violations of the 
business judgment rule. But perhaps the real value of the proposed 
standard is the work it does in aligning the goals of plan beneficiaries, 
fiduciaries, and the companies that sponsor the plans. 
This Note glossed over one final detail, which is that corporate 
directors and officers frequently serve as EIAP fiduciaries. One 
possibility is that the proposed standard might encourage companies 
to establish EIAPs with company stock ownership requirements in 
the range of conventionally acceptable risk that would be subject only 
 
 168.  Moench v. Robertson, 62 F.3d 553, 570 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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to the Moench presumption. Considering the fact that the retirement 
accounts of over fifteen million Americans are at stake, many would 
consider this to be a welcome development. But this outcome is 
unlikely. If companies abandoned EIAPs, they would miss the 
favorable tax treatment and the ability to use the plans as tools of 
corporate finance. By holding fiduciaries accountable for companies’ 
irrational business decisions that decrease the value of employees’ 
retirement accounts, the standard should encourage certain 
fiduciaries—namely those who are also corporate directors or 
officers—to self-regulate their behavior and police the behavior of 
their nonfiduciary counterparts who are also company agents to limit 
potential liability while continuing to reap the benefits of EIAPs. 
